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Abstract: The needs for effectively controlling carbon dioxide emissions and properly allocating carbon dioxide emission 
permits or allowances in China have never been so great. In this paper, a systematic multi-agent-based framework for the 
modelling and analysis of the allocation of carbon dioxide emission quotas in China is proposed. A carbon trading market 
model as the core of the activities of allocation management is constructed and discussed. In addition, examples of the 
modelling and simulation work are presented. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The world is faced with the huge threats of 
global warming. Low carbon economies are the 
important mode of development for dealing with the 
climate change. The Chinese government aims to 
build up a national carbon emission trading market 
gradually through pilot work and experiments, and 
wants to use the market mechanism to regulate the 
emissions of greenhouse gases, including carbon 
dioxide.
Nevertheless, because the experimental 
cities and pilot provinces in China adopt a top-down 
approach towards carbon emission data collection and 
emission target setting, carbon quota surplus has 
existed. On the other hand, Chinese enterprises have 
not fully recognised and realised the value of carbon 
emission permits or allowances as assets. When the 
prices of emission quotas go down, enterprises may 
lack motivation for carbon emission reduction. 
Therefore, effective frameworks, models and tools 
are urgently needed to support the analysis, 
forecasting and evaluation of carbon quota 
management activities.
 
2. RELEVANT WORK IN THE 
LITERATURE 
        Gagelmann [1] investigated the history-
based allocation mechanism for carbon quotas. 
Fowlie and Perloff [2] supported the use of the 
auction method.  Linghu and Ye [3] explored carbon 
emission allocation policies for various carbon quotas 
under duopoly competition. 
        Ma et al. [4] analysed the inter-
relationships amongst enterprise product pricing, 
emission reduction marginal costs and target emission 
decision-making. Ma et al. [4] also conducted 
research on how to determine optimal carbon 
emission, optimal price and profit maximisation. 
      Carmona [5], and Frunza et al. [6] explored 
respectively the factors that affect the prices of 
carbon quotas. 
        
3. A  FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
MODELLING ANALYSIS OF CARBON 
QUOTA ALLOCATION
       Multi-agent-based modelling and computer 
simulation paradigms are applied to represent and 
analyse the Chinese carbon market problem. The 
carbon market model consists of three agents: 
government agent, enterprise agent, and carbon 
trading market agent. 
       The government agent is created to describe 
the government’s responsibilities for allocating 
carbon emission quotas.  The enterprise agent is 
designed to model enterprise trading activities in the 
market, on the basis of emission reduction costs and 
carbon prices. The market agent is designed to deal 
with trading rules and pricing for carbon emission 
quotas.  
3.1. Government agent
        The main aim of the government agent is to 
reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide. Its 
management activities include: allocating carbon 
quotas, devising and regulating emission targets,  
auction, buying quotas back, etc. 
        According to different goals or targets of 
emission reduction, the government makes and sets 
associated emission reduction coefficients ranging 
from loose to strict levels of control, and manage the 
granted amount of quotas. These activities have 
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impacts on the changing costs of emission reduction, 
and also have influence on enterprise behaviour. 
        Taking into account carbon prices and the 
trends of supply-demand relationships in the market, 
the government adjusts and modifies the value of the 
emission reduction coefficients, and repurchase or 
auction carbon quotas, for the purpose of enabling the 
stable and healthy evolution and development of the 
carbon market. 
        The degree of government satisfaction is 
measured using a combination of quota delivery ratio 
and compliance enterprise ratio. This is an extension 
of Wang [7]’s water rights trading model. It is 
expressed as follows.
     
where S(t) stands for the level of government 
satisfaction; Aij(t) denotes the allocated quota for 
enterprise i of industrial sector j at time period t; Eij(t) 
represents the emission volume of enterprise i of 
industrial sector j at time period t; CEA(t) denotes the 
number of compliance enterprises; CE(t) strands for 
the total number of enterprises; ω0 and ω1 are the 
symbols for weights.
        Computer simulation has been conducted. 
As shown in Fig.1, the yellow line and the black line 
respectively indicate the degree of government 
satisfaction on the carbon trading market under 
tightly and loosely controlled situations. We can see 
that the yellow line is just below the black one. This 
indicates that the level of government satisfaction is 
lower when the circumstance is harsh, for the reason 
that strict conditions make emission reduction more 
difficult, and thus lead to smaller ratio of reduction.
Fig.1. The Simulation output of government satisfaction
3.2. Enterprise agent
        Different types of enterprises in the carbon 
market may have different goals. Low carbon 
enterprises may aim to maximize their profits of 
emission reduction, while high carbon enterprises 
may hope to minimize the costs of emission 
reduction.
        At the beginning of each time period, 
enterprises should first decide to sell or buy, and 
calculate  the optimal volume of emission reduction 
for themselves, on the basis of acquired quotas, 
estimated carbon prices and marginal cost curve of 
emission reduction. 
        A general decision making  process can be 
stated below. Information gathering, acquiring quotas 
for carbon dioxide emissions, forecasting prices for 
quotas, analysing marginal cost curve for emission 
reduction, deciding to buy or sell, and working out 
optimal emission reduction amount.
        The forecasting price for a carbon dioxide 
quota is formulated as: 
where  denotes the carbon quota price 
predicted by enterprise i of industrial sector j at time 
period t;  is the carbon quota price at 
time period (t-1);  is a positive random number; 
 stands for the quota demand amount in 
the market at time period (t-1);   stands 
for the quota supply amount in the market at time 
period (t-1). In this formula, is cited from Wei [8]’s 
work. It is a random disturbing item and represents 
other factors influencing carbon prices. 
 .
        Fig.2. Illustrates carbon price simulation. 
Fig.2. The sample output of carbon price simulation
        In Fig.2, the yellow line and the black line 
respectively represent the carbon prices under tightly 
controlled and loosely regulated situations. The 
general trends of carbon prices are going up, with 
some local fluctuation. 
(1)
(2)
        Fig.3. Shows the simulation output for the 
volume of emission reduction.
 
Fig.3. Simulation of the volume of emission reduction
        In Fig.3, the yellow line represents the 
required or expected volume for emission reduction 
under harsh conditions. The blue line stands for the 
completed volume of reduction under strict 
circumstances. The black line indicates the required 
volume of emission reduction under loose situations. 
The purple line denotes the completed volume of 
reduction under slack regulations. Generally speaking, 
the yellow line is close to the blue one. And the black 
line is very close to the purple one. This indicates that 
emission reduction goals can be achieved through the 
enterprises’ activities in the carbon dioxide trade 
market.
        Fig.4. Illustrates the simulation output for 
the net benefit of unit volume of emission reduction. 
This is a dynamic proportion result of the total net 
benefit of all the enterprises divided by the total 
volume of emission reduction of all the enterprises. 
        In Fig.4, the yellow line represents the 
enterprise unit net benefit of emission reduction 
under a situation with harsh control, while the black 
line denotes unit net benefit under a slack regulation. 
During the first quarter phase of the simulation run, 
the yellow line is above the black. This suggests that 
the potential for emission reduction is relatively 
greater during early stage, and enterprises can get 
larger unit net benefits through carbon quota trading. 
During the later three quarters of the time period, the 
yellow line is below the black. This implies that the 
level of difficulties for emission reduction increases 
in later stage. It would be more difficult for 
enterprises to obtain higher unit net benefit. Generally 
speaking, it is easier for enterprises to achieve bigger 
unit net benefits under loosely controlled situations. 
 Fig.4. The simulation result for the net benefit of unit volume of 
emission reduction
3.3. Carbon trading market agent
        Here, the market agent represents the 
activity of carbon emission rights exchange, and 
formulates rules for carbon trading. 
        Obviously, with different trading rules, the 
carbon price formation mechanisms are also different. 
The method used in this study is a method of bidding 
and matching of selling and buying parties. 
Successfully matched enterprises make exchange 
under certain prices. Unmatched enterprises also 
trade on the condition that the computed net benefit is 
positive under specified prices.                     
        For the purpose of simplicity, only cross 
period storage for quotas is allowed. The costs for 
monitoring, reporting and verification are not 
considered. 
        Fig.5 shows the simulation result for trade.
Fig.5. Simulation of trade in the carbon market
        As shown in Fig.5, the yellow line and the 
black line respectively denote the turnover proportion 
of trade volume to emission reduction volume, under 
tightly controlled and loosely regulated circumstances. 
It is clear that the black line is above the yellow one. 
This implies that, under relaxed situations, the ratio of 
exchange volume to emission reduction volume is 
relatively bigger. 
CONCLUSIONS
        This study has been sought to establish a 
systematic framework for the modelling of carbon 
dioxide emission quota allocation in China. The roles 
and activities of the government, enterprises and the 
carbon trade market are analysed, described and 
demonstrated. Examples of computer simulation 
outputs are also presented and discussed. 
        On the basis of the proposed framework, 
simulation runs have been conducted. It have been 
shown that, under loose control, the government is 
more satisfied with the carbon trade market. And the 
unit net benefit for enterprises is higher with an 
upward trend. 
        On the other hand, with tight and harsh 
control, enterprises are under lots of pressure. The 
phased target for emission reduction can be quickly 
achieved. However, in later stage of a period of time, 
enterprises may lack enthusiasm. And the market 
makes less contributions to carbon dioxide emission 
reduction. 
        It is recommended that, when the control is 
harsh with high coefficients for emission reduction, 
and when enterprises are under big pressure, the 
government should provide bonus and allowances to 
support and encourage the low carbon activities of 
enterprises. 
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